Bankruptcy--Loss of Exemptions in Bankruptcy--the Section 6 Proviso by Beckett, Bruce H.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 41 
Issue 1 Winter 1976 Article 12 
Winter 1976 
Bankruptcy--Loss of Exemptions in Bankruptcy--the Section 6 
Proviso 
Bruce H. Beckett 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce H. Beckett, Bankruptcy--Loss of Exemptions in Bankruptcy--the Section 6 Proviso, 41 MO. L. REV. 
(1976) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss1/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law 
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
gence, even though the defendant, by virtue of the fifth amendment, con-
ceals facts essential to that defense. To deny affirmative relief in one situa-
tion and grant what amounts to affirmative relief in the other is arguably
inconsistent.
If the defendant in a civil suit is allowed to assert both his privilege
against self-incrimination and an affirmative defense, he has a decided
advantage. The party bringing the action must submit to being fully de-
posed, but will be effectively denied the right to take the defendant's
deposition, and will thereby be deprived of a prime opportunity to obtain
admissions and impeachable statements. Furthermore, the plaintiff must
face the perils of cross-examination at trial, while the defendant sits com-
fortably behind the fifth amendment.
The Pulliam court acknowledged that . . . in some situations the
ruling . . . will present hardships to other litigants."' 3 2 Such hardships
would be greatly reduced if the court would apply consistent reasoning
and bar affirmative defenses as well as direct affirmative relief when a
party utilizes the fifth amendment shield.
JOEL WILSON
BANKRUPTCY-
LOSS OF EXEMPTIONS IN BANKRUPTCY-
THE SECTION 6 PROVISO
In re Myers'
Ten days before filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, the bank-
rupt conveyed title to residential property, which she had held as sole
owner, to her husband and herself as tenants by the entirety. The trustee
in bankruptcy filed a petition to take possession and control of the prop-
erty on the ground that the conveyance was fraudulent under section 67d
of the Bankruptcy Act.2 After a hearing, the referee found that the transfer
was made without fair consideration, at a time when the bankrupt was
insolvent, and with actual intent to defraud creditors, in violation of
sections 67d(2)(a) and 67d(2)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act.3 He ordered the
22. 514 S.W.2d at 561.
1. 383 F. Supp, 251 (W.D Mo. 1975).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 107d (1970).
3. Sections 67d (2) (a) and (2) (d) provide that:
Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor within one
year prior to the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this
Act by or against him is fraudulent (a) as to creditors existing at the time
of such transfer or obligation, if made or incurred without fair consid-
eration by a debtor who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent, with-
out regard to his actual intent; or... (d) as to then existing and future
creditors, if made or incurred with actual intent as distinguished from
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conveyance set aside and possession of the premises given up for sale by
the trustee. The bankrupt objected to the referee's order alleging that it
made no provision for her homestead exemption as provided by section
513.475, RSMo 1969.4 The referee rejected this claim on the ground that
the proviso to section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act5 specifically provides that
the bankrupt cannot claim an exemption in property recovered by the
trustee. Pursuant to section 39c of the Bankruptcy Act,6 bankrupt sought
review of the referee's order disallowing the homestead exemption. On
review, the district court upheld the referee's order.7
Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act provides:
This title shall not affect allowance to bankrupts of the exemp-
tions which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by
the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in
the State wherein they have had their domicile ... 8
It is well-established that this language "makes the state laws . . the
measure of the right to exemptions" 9 allowed a bankrupt. This means that
the variety of exemptions allowed by state law are to be recognized in
bankruptcy, as well as the construction state courts have given the exemp-
tion laws.10 State law, however, is not always the only consideration, be-
cause "even if the state law permits the exemption, it also must be one
allowable under federal law."" The federal law which must be considered
in bankruptcy is, of course, the Bankruptcy Act itself.
In 1938 Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act by passing the Chand-
ler Act.12 This Act added the following proviso to section 6:
4. Section 513.475, RSMo 1969, provides:
The homestead of every housekeeper or head of a family, consisting of
a dwelling house and appurtenances, and the land used in connection
therewith, not exceeding the amount in value herein limited, which is
or shall be used by such housekeeper or head of a family as such home-
stead, shall, together with the rents, issues and products thereof, be exempt
from attachment and execution, except as herein provided; such home-
stead in the country shall not include more than one hundred and sixty
acres of land, or exceed the total value of fifteen hundred dollars; and
in cities having a population of forty thousand or more, such homesteid
shall not include more than eighteen square rods of ground, or exceed
the total value of three thousand dollars; and in cities having a popula-
tion of ten thousand and less than forty thousand, such homestead shall
not include more than thirty square rods of ground, or exceed the total
value of fifteen hundred dollars; and in cities and incorporated towis
and villages having a population of less than ten thousand, such home-
stead shall, not include more than five acres of ground, or exceed the
total value of fifteen hundred dollars.
5. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 67c (1970).
7. 383 F. Supp. at 262.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
9. White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310, 312 (1924).
10. See Phillips v. C. Palomo &e Sons, 270 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1959). See
generally IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 6.03 [3] at 798-803 (14th ed. 1975).
11. In re Hygrade Envelope Corp., 272 F. Supp. 451, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 1967),
rev'd on other grounds, 393 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1968).
12. Act of June 22, 1938, c. 575. 52 Stat. 847, 11 U.S.C. § 324 (1970).
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Provided, however, that no such allowance shall be made out of
the property which a bankrupt transferred or concealed and which
is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this Act for
the benefit of the estate, except that, where the voided transfer
was made by way of security only and the property recovered is
in excess of the amount secured thereby, such allowance may be
made out of such excess.' 3
Prior to the adoption of this proviso there was a split of authority as to
whether a bankrupt could claim exemptions in property that had been
recovered by the trustee in bankruptcy following the bankrupt's fraudulent
conveyance of the property.14 "Most of the decisions had reference to the
applicable state law, since the Bankruptcy Act had no express provisions on
the subject."' 5 Where such claims were made, the decisions allowing the
exemptions rested on one of two bases. First, to the extent of the exemp-
tion, the conveyance was considered not to have harmed creditors.' 0 Sec-
ond, the statutory provision for the homestead exemption was deemed
to be for the benefit of the bankrupt's family as well as the bankrupt; thus,
to deny the exemption would be to give "creditors a profit out of the
attempted fraud, at the expense of the family...... ."u Some decisions deny-
ing the exemptions rested upon the ground that the bankrupt forfeited
his exemption by his fraudulent conduct.' 8 Others held that when the
conveyance was set aside as fraudulent, title did not again vest in the bank-
rupt; thus, the bankrupt owned no property out of which an exemption
could be claimed at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed.' 0
Congress enacted the proviso to section 6 in an effort to resolve this
conflict. 20 Judges, 21 commentators, 22 and treatises 23 all seem to agree that
13. 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1970).
14. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 6.11[4], 856-57 (14th ed. 1975); 161 A.L.R.
1009, 1018-1019 (1946).
15. IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY jf 6.11[4], 856-57 (14th ed. 1975).
16. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 140 F. 257 (D.C. Wash. 1905). This is the view
taken by Missouri courts. See cases cited note 36 infra.
17. See, e.g., Cox v. Wilder, 6 Fed. Cas. 684 (No. 3,308) (C.C. Mo. 1872).
18. See, e.g., In re Hupp, 43 F.2d 159 (S.D. Cal. 1930); In re Coddington,
126 F. 891 (M.D. Pa. 1904).
19. See, e.g., In re Heeg, 22 Am. Bankr. R. 120 (D.C. Ref. Wisc. 1932).
20. In the proviso added to [section 6] no allowance shall be made for ex-
emptions out of property which is recovered after a preference or fraud-
ulent transfer. The decisions are conflicting and it is considered that the
law should be made clear that a bankrupt should not profit at the ex-
pense of the creditors from the efforts of the trustee in undoing the bank-
rupt's own acts.
HR. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937).
21. See, e.g., In re Grisanti, 58 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Ky. 1945):
[I]t was the intention of Congress in enacting this proviso in the 1938
Act to dear up this conflict by making the matter uniform throughout
the country and not to permit an allowance to be made out of property
which is recovered after a preference or fraudulent transfer.
Id. at 647. Accord, In re Rogers, 45 F. Supp. 297, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
22. [I]t would seem that a bankrupt may not claim a homestead in prop-
erty fraudulently conveyed, transferred by way of preference, or concealed
from the trustee and creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings.
[Vol. 41
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this proviso effectively eliminates a bankrupt's right to claim exemptions
in property once it has been recovered by the trustee after having been
fraudulently conveyed by the bankrupt. In Myers the referee found the
conveyance of the bankrupt's homestead to be fraudulent. The bankrupt
did not seek review of this finding.2 4 The referee set aside the conveyance
and correctly denied the bankrupt's claim to a homestead exemption under
the proviso to section 6.
Section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act allows the trustee to assume the
position of a creditor who possesses a lien on the property of the bankrupt.25
Thus, where state law dictates that an exemption cannot be claimed
against a creditor who has levied on property of the debtor, it also cannot
be claimed against the trustee, who represents all creditors in a bankruptcy
proceeding.26 Bankrupts have lost their homestead exemption, for ex-
ample, by failing to perfect the exemption with a filing required under
local law declaring their residence a homestead. 27 Such a result would
not occur where no filing is required to perfect a homestead or other
exemption.28
In Missouri, the homestead exemption is automatically perfected
against all causes of action which mature after the filing of the deed vesting
title in the debtor.29 To establish a homestead in Missouri the debtor is
merely required to own and occupy the residence as a homestead.30 Fail-
ure to continue to meet the requirements of ownership and occupancy may
be deemed a waiver or abandonment of the homestead exemption. What
constitutes an abandonment depends upon the facts of each case.31 For
Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1289, 1318 (1950).
23. Under the terms of the Act of 1938, the conflict has been stilled....
It is dear, therefore, that wherever the trustee recovers property transferred
or concealed by the bankrupt, or where any transfer can be avoided under
the terms of the Act, the bankrupt will not be allowed to amend his sched-
ules and claim exemptions out of that particular property, save in the
situation within the "except" dause.
IA COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 6.11[4], 857 (14th ed. 1975).
24. The referee's finding that the conveyance was fraudulent and may be
set aside in toto, even though a portion of the property may have been exempt,
was undoubtedly correct under sections 67d(2)(a) and 67d(2)(d) of the Bankruptcy
Act. See Haskins, Homestead Exemptions, 63 HARv. L. Rlv. 1289, 1318 (1950):
[I]f both the homestead and nonexempt property are fraudulently con-
veyed in one parcel, or if an excessive homestead or one reachable by some
creditors is fraudulently conveyed, the trustee may set aside the transfer
and the bankrupt can not claim a homestead exemption. (Emphasis
added).
See also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ff 67.30, 490 (14th ed. 1975).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
26. Meyers v. Matley, 318 U.S. 622 (1943); White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310
(1924).
27. See 1A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY if 6.15, 877 (14th ed. 1975).
28. See, e.g., In re Trammell, 5 F.2d 326 (N.D. Ga. 1925).
29. Dent v. Dent, 350 Mo. 560, 568, 166 S.W.2d 582, 586 (1942); Palmer v.
Omer, 316 Mo. 1188, 1194, 295 S.W. 123, 125 (1927).
30. Rouse v. Caton, 168 Mo. 288, 296, 67 S.W. 578, 579 (1902).
81. New Madrid Banking Co. v. Brown, 165 Mo. 32, 37, 65 S.W. 297, 299(1901).
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example, although a lease of property which was a homestead may consti-
tute abandonment, it has been held that temporarily renting the homestead
does not.82 A valid conveyance by a debtor of his homestead clearly consti-
tutes an abandonment of the claim to the exemption. 83
A conveyance which consists only of exempt property cannot be set
aside in a Missouri state court as a fraud against creditors, even though
made without consideration and with intent to defraud creditors. This is
because creditors could not have reached the property even if the convey-
ance had not been made. 34 Where a transfer is made of property which
includes exempt homestead property, but is in excess of the exemption
allowed with respect to acreage or value,3 5 the conveyance may be set aside
as fraudulent. The debtor, however, may still claim his homestead exemp-
tion out of the property conveyed on the theory that, to the extent of
the exemption, the conveyance was not fraudulent.3 6 Simply stated, the law
of Missouri is that the conveyance of a homestead is fraudulent only to
the extent that the value of the property conveyed exceeds the exemp-
tions which could have been claimed therein had it not been conveyed.
Therefore, such a conveyance does not destroy the exemption.
Were state law the only factor to be considered, then, the bankrupt
in Myers would not have lost her homestead exemption by her convey.
ance of the homestead property, even though the property conveyed may
have been in excess of the exemption and in fraud of her creditors. Where
exemptions are claimed in a bankruptcy proceeding, however, state law
is preempted by the Bankruptcy Act. "Once bankruptcy has intervened, the
time manner and conditions under which such exemption may be claimed
as against the trustee are matters of federal law, and are determined by the
Bankruptcy Act."37 In Myers the proviso to section 6 preempted Missouri
law to deny the bankrupt her exemption.
32. Spratt v. Early, 169 Mo. 357, 369, 69 S.W. 13, 17 (1902).
33. Mercantile Bank v. Becker, 43 S.W.2d 862, 863 (1931).
34. This proposition is accepted by both state courts and bankruptcy courts.
See Phillips v. C. Palomo & Sons, 270 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1959); Kilgo v. United
Distributors, 223 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1955); Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467 (5th
Cir. 1945); Bostian v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1951); Moberly v. Watson, 340
Mo. 820, 102 S.W.2d 886 (1937); May v. Gibler, 319 Mo. 672, 4 S.W.2d 769 (1928);
Armor v. Lewis, 252 Mo. 568, 161 S.W. 251 (1913); Seilert v. McAnally, 223 Mo.
505, 122 S.W. 1064 (1909); Reed Bros. v. Nicholson, 189 Mo. 396, 88 S.W. 71
(1905); Starn v. Smith, 183 Mo. 464, 81 S.W. 1217 (1904); Spratt v. Easley, 169
Mo. 357, 69 S.W. 13 (1902); Rose v. Smith, 167 Mo. 81, 66 S.W. 940 (1901); Bar-
tels v. Kinninger, 144 Mo. 370, 46 S.W. 163 (1898); Hart v. Leete, 104 Mo. 315,
15 S.W. 976 (1891); Davis v. Land, 88 Mo. 436 (1885); State v. Diveling, 66 Mo.
375 (1877).
35. See statute quoted note 4 supra.
36. See Bank of New Cambria v. Briggs, 361 Mo. 723, 236 S.W.2d 289 (1951),
where, in a suit by a levying judgment creditor, it was held that a conveyance
of homestead property by an insolvent debtor was fraudulent only to the extent
that the property's value exceeded the exemption. See also Moberly v. Watson,
340 Mo. 820, 102, S.W.2d 886 (1937); May v. Gibler, 319 Mo. 672, 4 S.W.2d 769
(1928); Reed Bros. v. Nicholson, 189 Mo. 396, 88 S.W. 71 (1905).
37. Gardner v. Johnson, 195 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1952). The court in
[Vol. 41
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The Missouri practitioner should be mindful of the differences be-
tween ordinary debtor-creditor cases and those involving bankruptcy. Where
the debtor seeks an exemption in property, the fraudulent conveyance of
which has been set aside by a levying creditor, the debtor will generally
be allowed the exemption. Where bankruptcy is involved, however, the
proviso to section 6 will apply and the exemption will be denied. The only
exceptions to the application of the proviso appear to be where the trustee
has set aside a general assignment for the benefit of the bankrupt's cred-
itors38 and where the transfer that was set aside was made by way of
security within the "except" clause to the proviso.39
Counsel for an insolvent client should advise against conveying or
concealing property out of which exemptions may be claimed, in order to
avoid the proviso's application. If a fraudulent conveyance of homestead
property has already been made, as was the case in Myers, the debtor should
attempt to have the conveyance rescinded prior to any action by the trustee
to recover the property. If this is done, it may be argued that the proviso
applies only if there has been a recovery of property under the Bankruptcy
Act, and that a voluntary recovery by the bankrupt is not such a recovery.
BRuCE H. BEcKETr
Gardner denied a claimed exemption out of property recovered by the trustee
under the proviso to section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act, holding that setting aside
a fraudulent conveyance did not revest title in the bankrupt so as to allow him
to claim an exemption out of the property so recovered, and that even if title did
return to the bankrupt, the proviso would bar an amendment of his schedules
of property and exemptions claimed. For other cases concerning the application
of the proviso, see In re Smith, 366 F. Supp. 1218 (D.C. Idaho 1973) (the proviso
has no application where the conveyance of bankrupt's homestead was by deed
of trust for security purposes); In re Sherk, 108 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ohio 1952)
(where trustee recovered money settlements from transferees of the bankrupt
in lieu of setting aside the transfers as fraudulent, the bankrupt was denied an
exemption out of those settlements); In re Grisanti, 58 F. Supp. 646 (W.D. Ky.
1945) (where a creditor was denied status as a secured creditor because the en-
cumbrance given him by the bankrupt was fraudulent, the bankrupt's claimed
homestead exemption in the encumbered property was denied); In re Rogers, 45
F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1942) (bankrupt could not claim exemptions out of
the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy he owned which he had at-
tempted to conceal from the trustee in bankruptcy).
38. In re Knapp, 319 F. Supp. 1070 (S.D. Ill. 1970); IA COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTcY ff 6.11[6], 860-63 (14th ed. 1975).
39. IA CounR ON BANRu-rcy ff 6.11[4], 857 (14th ed. 1975).
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